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keep to my diet. It would be wrong to say in retrospect 
that I didn't really care about having the cheesecake in 
the first place. Rather, we should say I no longer care 
about having more cheesecake because, having 
committed dietary sin, I now care more about returning 
to my diet. In short, I do not see how Russow's 
distinction between "caring about" and "thinking we 
care about" does more work than the distinction between 
"taking an interest in" and "successfully promoting 
one's self-interest." To say that smokers take an interest 
in smoking, but smoking is not really in their self-
interest, strikes me as more in accord with our ordinary 
concepts than saying that smokers think they care about 
smoking, but do not really care, since smoking does 
not contribute to their long-term happiness. Similarly, 
to say that my cat Bryseis takes an interest in roaming 
free outside, but roaming free outside is not really in 
her self-interest, makes more sense to me than to say 
that Bryseis thinks she cares about roaming free outside, 
but she does not really care, since it probably endangers 
her long-term happiness. 
Russow has made a decent attempt to advance the 
discussion of how best to talk about animals' interests, 
desires, and happiness. However, her proposed 
defmition of"caring about" fails to mark the qualitative 
difference between caring about an object and caring 
about a subject and does not, in fact, accord well with 
our ordinary concept of caring about generally. 
Moreover, since Russow's discussion is deficient at the 
theoretical level on these points, its application to 
questions about specific animals-for example, whether 
housecats care about being allowed to stray outside, 
being spayed or neutered, etc.-is not promising. 
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I could respond by answering Professor Stephens' 
specific questions about his cats: either offering a 
judgment about what they do and don't care about, or 
explaining what one would do to determine that. But 
that would fill up all the remaining time, and miss his 
deeperconcerns. Instead, I'll say just a few words about 
two more general concerns that he raises, either 
explicitly or implicitly: 
(1) how we can determine the object of intentional 
states, including caring, and 
(2) why "caring about" is an improvement over talk 
about interests. 
I take it that the philosophical issue underlying 
Stephens' questions about what his cats care about in 
specific incidents is the concern that there may be no 
legitimate way of answering these questions. The full 
answer to his concern would be too complicated to lay 
out in detail-not because he's asking about cats, but 
because specifying the object of any mental state is a 
complicated business. Nonetheless, I'll try to indicate 
some of the factors that should be involved. 
First, sometimes de re specifications ofmental states 
are the most appropriate ones. That is to say, we can 
say that Chryseis believes ofStephens that he is a source 
of food, without claiming or being committed to 
anything about how he is "represented." The same is 
true of other propositional attitudes, especially caring 
about. Thus, it is certainly reasonable, and perhaps even 
necessary, at times to read "Chryseis cares about 
Stephens" as a de re attitude. 
Even if there is good reason to demand a de dicto 
account of a mental state, there still may be good 
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reason to suspect that we may not be able to specify 
the content of the state in English. First, the concepts 
of an individual who does not use or know English 
may well be different in important ways from those 
easily expressible in English. Indeed, given the 
anti-Fregean moves in contemporary philosophy of 
language, the so-called ''narrow content" ofa state may 
not be properly expressible in any public language. 
Second, when we are concerned specifically with 
caring about, rather than just any mental state, we are 
apt to conflate questions about how to specify the 
object of the state with the more practical issue: what 
would count as an adequate substitute for what is cared 
about, what would make the subject happy in the same 
sort of way. Thus, when we ask whether a cat really 
cares about her dead companion, we may really be 
trying to figure out whether introducing a new kitten 
would "make things right again." 
As I said, these remarks only touch the surface of 
questions about fixing and describing the objects of 
care, but I hope they are in keeping with my original 
suggestion: current developments in philosophy of 
mind can help us develop a more sophisticated and 
more accurate way of thinking about the objects of 
mental states. 
The second issue I want to address is the proper 
understanding of "care." I have proposed to analyze 
"caring about" in terms of two factors: desire and 
happiness. Thus, we can say about cats who want go 
outside: they might desire to roam, but wouldbe happier 
staying inside, even though they don't realize that. The 
question of how we should interpret a cat's behavior in 
order "to judge what would make her happiest" is 
misleading: the eat's current behavior is often not the 
sole or even most important data about what will make 
her happy. Since the second condition in our definition 
of "caring about" refers to the future, it is possible for x 
to be such that it will make one happy, and thus it is 
possible for someone to care about x, but not know that 
x will make her happy, and hence not know that she 
cares about x. This state of affairs is even more likely 
to occur with nonhuman animals than with normal, 
adult, language using humans. It is also relevant to 
cases such as Stephens' cheesecake example: if eating 
the cheesecake did not, in fact, contribute to his 
happiness (i.e., he eats the cheesecake and is no 
happier afterwards-perhaps even feels disappointed), 
I would argue that, even though he wanted or desired 
the cheesecake, he was simply mistaken in thinking 
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that he cared about it. If we tell the story slightly 
differently (eating one small slice of cake made him 
happy, given that he was able to return to his diet), then 
we should conclude that he cares about eating 
cheesecake in moderation. 
Proper attention to the details ofmy proposal is also 
relevant to Stephens' suggestion that my proposed 
analysis of caring fails to do justice to caring for other 
subjects. I explicit denied the claim that we care about 
things because they contribute to our happiness. If we 
avoid that mistake, I fail to see how caring for other 
subjects falls outside my account. 
I can only briefly mention two other points 
Stephens brings up. First, does the fact that Scares 
about x engender a prima facie duty to ensure that S 
obtains x? The short answer is that my account was not 
intended to give a complete answer, although I will point 
out that we do hold people morally culpable for 
neglecting animals for whom they are responsible. 
Second, he objects to my claim that computers might 
have desires on the grounds that they don't have nervous 
systems. This seems to me to beg the question against 
artificial intelligence in particular, and functionalist 
accounts of mind in general. 
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